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For Life Writing and the Public Sphere:
CRITICAL INJURIES: COLLABORATIVE INDIGENOUS LIFE WRITING AND THE ETHICS OF CRITICISM
Publishing one's life renders it public property, and those who do so cannot (or should not) expect that their representation of themselves, and especially of others, will meet with universal approval. G. Thomas Couser, Vulnerable Subjects: Ethics and Life Writing (199) Is there harm in life writing? Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (159) For well over a decade the imbrication of ethics and literature has been the focus of substantial scholarly interest with particular attention paid to how literature intersects with public life. 1 Paul John Eakin's question regarding harm in life writing signals a similar turn in the critical reading of life writing towards this consideration of ethics. As autobiographical theory has shifted from models dependent upon notions of autonomy to understandings that foreground relational constructions, analysis of life writing such as Eakin's is beginning to take into account the ethical issues embedded in the representation of relational lives. Indeed, in his latest publication Eakin goes further, suggesting that he has come "to think of ethics as the deep subject of autobiographical discourse" (The Ethics of Life Writing, 6).
In the reading of collaborative Indigenous life writing, the question of harm has long been a core concern. Critical attention has tended to focus on the issue of power relations, asking how power has been distributed or activated in the production of the collaborative work and what traces of power differentials remain inscribed in the published text.
Underlying these discussions of power is the inferred critical objective of discerning instances or aspects of collaboration in which benefit or harm may be detected, either in outcomes such as copyrights and royalties, or in terms of the textualisation of Indigenous lives and their potential subordination to non-Indigenous discursive control. Publication of collaborative texts rightly places both the text and its conditions of production under public scrutiny and such scrutiny evokes ethical claims. Critics intent upon tracking the circulation of power within cross-cultural collaboration are engaged, whether they admit it or not, in ethical criticism. The question I would like to ask in this article, then, pertains to the engagement that takes place between collaborative Indigenous life writing and its critics. While recognising that harm can certainly result from collaborative life writing encounters, I also wish to ask whether harm may be occasioned through the criticism of collaborative Indigenous life writing, and to consider the implications of such harm, if it exists, for literary theory.
Ethical Criticism
Eakin's interest in the ethics of life writing stems from his critical attention to the relational features of identity formation and representation. In his chapter devoted to ethics and life writing in How Our Lives Become Stories (1999), Eakin discusses the ethical concerns raised in the acknowledgement that all biographical and autobiographical representation involves an infringement upon the lives of others. Setting the need and respect for privacy and autonomy beside texts from diverse aspects of life writing, Eakin asks: "What is right and fair for me to write about someone else? What is right and fair for someone else to write about me?" (160). He explores these questions through biography, ethnographic autobiography and collaborative autobiography and in doing so touches upon issues of ownership and copyright as well as privacy, appropriation and ventriloquism, concerns that anyone acquainted with the enormous body of Indigenous life writing produced in collaboration with non-Indigenous writers and editors will find familiar. In the texts Eakin reads, however, answers do not come readily when the implications of relational lives are taken seriously: that the boundaries between self and other are porous and shifting and that narratives of self and other are necessarily co-dependent. Eakin argues that a rift has opened between representational practices based upon multiplicity of voice, subject and textual production and the retention in the culture of individualism of "existing models of privacy, personhood, and ethics" (186). While suggesting that such models may have to be revised, Eakin also maintains that moral responsibilities continue to adhere to the act of writing with or about another because of the harm incipient in the process of textualisation. A life once written and published "is accessible to harm. One can strike at a textual body" (172). Although elsewhere in his chapter Eakin tends to focus on the potential for harm within life writing -constituted through the decisions, the revelations, the inclusions or occlusions made by the life writer(s) -here, significantly, he admits to the exposure to harm from without, which by implication would include harm resulting from the criticism of life writing.
"One can strike at a textual body" is an acknowledgement that in life writing there is vulnerability. This recognition of vulnerability is the basis of G. Thomas Couser's latest work, Vulnerable Subjects (2004) , which investigates the ethics of life writing undertaken on the behalf of another. Whether through severe disability, radical cultural difference, illiteracy or the ultimate silence of death, the subjects of the texts Couser reads are vulnerable to exploitation and violation because of their extreme dependency upon others for their representation. In such cases, he argues, "(e)thical scrutiny is most urgent" (15).
Couser sets up two theoretical frames that assist in his discussion of ethics and life writing. The first draws upon the ethical guidelines of biomedicine and anthropology, as the majority of the texts Couser reads in this study fall somewhere within or between the spheres of biomedical and ethnographic representation. The concept of fiduciary relationships, paralleling those between patient and doctor, facilitate critical understanding of the forms of collaborative writing studied. Such relationships are defined by the interdependence of trust and vulnerability, where the benefit to the subject -in terms of treatment or, in life writing, representation -is (potentially) maximized by placing that subject in a position of trust that is (potentially) open to exploitation or abuse (17). Qualifying and protecting this fiduciary relationship are the four principles of biomedicine: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. For Couser the first three are especially salient in life writing. The principle of autonomy is based upon respect for the integrity of the person. Here the Kantian edict, common in much ethical criticism, is evoked: that a person should not be treated simply as a means but as an end; as an autonomous being with motives, goals and rationales that call for engagement and respect. In life writing this would mean a respect for "the ideals of agency, responsibility, accountability, and intentionality" (18) rather than an outmoded concern with an atomistic self and in this light autonomy can be seen as a quality that persists in relationships of interdependency such as those which generate collaborative life writing. Further, the biomedical principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence entail "obligations to prevent harm or evil, to remove harm or evil, and to do or promote good"
(27), conditions that Couser sees as useful in approaching life writing ethics as well. He admits that it may be difficult or impossible to measure the good resulting from life writing, but on the other hand, "it may be proper to expect that writers at least do no harm to consenting vulnerable subjects" (28). Avoidance of harm is encoded as a primary ethical principle in anthropological statements of ethics as well, and along with concerns for consent, disclosure, privacy and reciprocity, bring the two spheres into meaningful correspondence. Moreover, anthropology acknowledges that harm can be done to communities as well as individuals and Couser is attentive to the implications of this for his study of narratives produced in collaboration with marginalised, disabled, or disenfranchised subjects whose identity or narratives may not be detachable from the community in which they are located. The concern for identifying potential harm resultant from engagement in life writing corresponds significantly to the questions raised by Eakin and, as we shall see, opens the inquiry, albeit with some reluctance, to questions of critical harm.
The second theoretical frame for Couser's discussion of ethics in life writing is taken from Wayne Booth's The Company We Keep (1988) . In his chapter titled "Making, Taking, and Faking Lives: Voice and Vulnerability in Collaborative Life Writing,"
Couser extracts from Booth's investigation of ethics in fiction a set of key questions that are equally or perhaps more compelling when applied to life writing: "What are the author's responsibilities to those whose lives are used as 'material'? What are the author's responsibilities to others whose labor is exploited to make the work of art possible? What are the responsibilities of the author to truth?" (Vulnerable Subjects, 34).
In terms of collaborative life writing these three questions allow Couser's discussion of ethical obligations to range across issues including property -the copyright and ownership concerns resulting from the making of texts; narrative appropriation -taking another's story as one's own; and ventriloquy -faking the voice of another.
Focusing on the ethical obligations of the author or writer of collaborative works seems to apportion a greater share of power towards the maker of the text, but Couser is careful to distinguish situations in which this may be the case from collaborations where power may in fact reside with the narrating subject. Couser proposes, therefore, a continuum based on power-recognition. At one end would be located ethnographic life histories, in which he sees the subject holding little power or control over textual production. At the other end would be ghost-written or as-told-to celebrity autobiographies in which the high commodity value of the subjects' story results in their exercising greater power. In the middle may be found collaborations in which partners are more or less equal in terms of their influence over the text, as might be the situation in co-authored narratives of intimate or familial relationships (40). Ethical issues exist in each, though the critic's focus will be different depending upon at which end of the spectrum the text falls.
According to Couser:
In cases, especially ethnographic ones, in which the model or source is taken advantage of by the writer, the ethical duty of the critic may be to defend the disenfranchised subject; in the case of celebrity autobiography, the ethical duty of the critic may be to protect the historical record (46). In Couser's comments on the duties of the critic, the focus again is on identifying harm:
harm to the subject of the narrative, or falsification of the historical record. Although
Couser ends his chapter with the cautionary words that "we must be attentive to the benefits as well as the liabilities of collaboration" (55), his point earlier that benefits may be difficult to define or impossible to measure means that critical attention by default seems to concentrate on the occasions of harm resulting from collaboration. The impact of published critical responses to life writing on those whose lives and labour have contributed to the text is a matter that critics tend to treat lightly. Couser, for example, argues that critics' "actual influence is often not very substantial. For better or worse, such critics are hardly in a position to suppress writers who reach audiences quite independently of academic sanction" (199). Elsewhere, however, Couser admits that the ethical criticism of life writing is both retrospective and prospective: that critical attention to potential ethical violations in life writing has bearing upon both previously published texts and future collaborative projects (55). If this is the case, then certainly critical comment could have some influence, however "indirect and diffuse" (55), upon issues such as a publisher's decision to reprint a text that has come to be widely read as violating the intentions of its Indigenous participants. This is especially relevant in the context of Australian publishing where both mainstream publishers and smaller presses alike are increasingly sensitive to the politics of representation. The fact that Ingelba has never been reprinted may not be attributable to the dismissive treatment of its critics, but this fact nonetheless has direct consequences upon local Indigenous readers who have not been able to buy the book for more than a decade and so cannot replace copies that have become worn, damaged, or lost. 8 Given that the purpose of the book for many of its
Aboriginal contributors in the Armidale region was that of a keeping place for memory and narrative, it is surely a major disappointment that Ingelba is no longer available for purchase.
My point, again, is that critical responses focusing on perceived harm and abuse in the collaborative processes do so often without proper engagement with the participants deemed to have been exploited. Stephen Connors sees voice as being key to the possibility of ethical engagement. Voice "marks the limit of the ethical," he writes. "That which has no voice, or which utters inarticulately, has no place in or positive bearing upon ethics" (232). His remarks are especially pertinent to criticism which claims to defend vulnerable subjects, and in the present discussion, that which focuses upon collaborative Indigenous life writing. For if through textual analysis the critic decides that the vulnerable subject has been over-written, her preferences for textual representation not respected, or her subject position trapped within discursive folds beyond her control, then voice in such texts must be read as missing. Grossman concludes just this in the case of Ingelba when she writes that "if we want to locate Patsy Cohen through her own words and choices as a textual subject, we will have to look and to read elsewhere" (164). In criticism which is rigorous in its insistence that its target is the text and that textual figures are sundered through publication from their historical counterparts, the disposition to read for compromise and harm, for occasions of over-writing, or for instances of the silencing of the Indigenous subject has the ironic result of removing the 8 According to Somerville, there were never enough copies available to meet local demand even when the book was first released and as copies have been lost or damaged in the intervening years the issue of access to the book by those whose lives or whose families contributed to its making is becoming difficult. Despite the fact that Ingelba is on reading lists for university courses across the country, the publisher, Allen & Unwin, will not consider reprinting the text. responses to collaboration, the Indigenous subject has indeed been doubly silenced.
"To give voice, or be capable of giving voice, it is necessary to have been given voice. To count as an ethical partner, one must be a potential interlocutor," writes Connor (233).
With this in mind, it is worthwhile asking whether critics of collaborative life writing consider the vulnerable subjects whose textual formations they analyse as potential interlocutors, that is, as potential readers of critical work. For Couser, the answer would be no, as most of the texts with which he is concerned involve death or such severe disability as to negate the possibility of response. In the case of collaborative Indigenous life writing, however, this clearly is not the case. In many situations, the Indigenous producers of collaborative texts may be quite capable of reading academic treatments of their work and if the producers of the life narrative text are not themselves readers, then their children and grandchildren most certainly are. Illiteracy therefore is less of an excuse today than in previous decades for the critical disregard for the vulnerable subject as reader. Nor is the fact that much of the critical commentary on collaborative life writing is published in academic journals of limited readership an excuse for overlooking the potential for engagement with Indigenous producers of collaborative texts. Digital access to many journals means that once a critic's views are published -made public -they circulate along potentially unforeseen channels and it is incumbent upon those who are privileged through education and career to be able to write about others' lives and others' texts to consider those others as readers and as interlocutors.
Critical Collaboration
Is it not the case that in defending the vulnerable the critic is in effect speaking for another perceived as being unable to speak for herself? Linda Alcoff makes the point that speaking about others or about the textual representations of others often seeps over into speaking for them, making it difficult to disentangle the two practices. In both speaking
for and speaking about others, the critic is "engaging in the act of representing the other's needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are" (9), Alcoff writes. Such representations, she insists, have consequences. "Even if someone never hears of the discursive self I present of them they may be affected by the decisions others make after hearing it" (10). This is precisely the issue I alluded to above in discussing the impacts of criticism on channels of publication and dissemination. While certainly diffuse and indirect and therefore difficult to trace, the pathways opened by critical commentary do return to those commented upon in one form or another. And if this is the case, it may be appropriate for critics to reflect upon their authority and upon the possibility of consultation with those being spoken over. Alcoff sees this as an unlikely scenario as "(i)ntellectual work has certainly not been guided by the mandate to get permission from those whom one is speaking for and about" (11). Yet in the academic landscape that has emerged through the 1990s and into the present decade, consultation with Indigenous subjects whose work is the focus of one's research and scholarly comment is not such a fanciful suggestion.
Given the postcolonial turn that has marked both literary studies and anthropology with a heightened attentiveness to the imbrications of knowledge-generation and processes of subjugation/domination active in both disciplines, consultation has in some situations become a prerequisite.
Although the compound issue of representation and consultation has radically changed the practice of anthropology over the past two decades, literary studies seems to have fixed upon the first of these terms while largely ignoring the second. But just as anthropology's crisis of authority began with the recognition of the rhetorical basis of its knowledge production and from this moved to a reflection upon the partiality of its representations which in conjunction with the increased politicisation of the peoples once studied resulted in demands from both within and without the discipline for greater consultation and ethical engagement with its subjects, so too may literary studies move towards such engagement and, I would argue, a more ethical practice. Especially when literary criticism involves the work of non-Indigenous scholars commenting upon Indigenous representations, engagement becomes crucial.
On the other hand, there is, of course, a key distinction between the methodologies of the two disciplines that problematise such a shift in literary criticism. Anthropology's reliance on fieldwork for its source material means that it is forced to negotiate with those whose narratives, knowledge systems and material and representational practices supply the discipline with its subject matter and has led in recent practice to the recognition of reciprocity and the need for the return of benefits to those whose labour/knowledge has been treated as resource. Literary theory thus far has been exempt from such lived and embodied entanglements. The textual basis of its source material means that knowledge can be constructed without regard for the persons whose representational practices, because they are published, have entered the public domain and become available for all
to make of what they will. "There is nothing outside the text" (158), Derrida exhorts and although his point is not that extra-textual concerns such as politics and historical process are somehow split off from what happens in any given text -on the contrary, deconstruction aims toward the understanding that politics, history, and social change are all thoroughly textual and thus are woven into the fabric of other texts -his words are too often taken by textual critics to support a methodology of disengagement. It is this textbased foundation which excuses the distanced work of the literary critic who finds within the stacks of the university library and its document delivery service all the material needed for knowledge creation.
Anthropologist Jeremy Beckett has lamented that although his discipline has been radically reshaped by theoretical insights imported from the fields of philosophy, history, and literary and cultural criticism, it seems that the traffic is mostly one-way, and that critical thought in other disciplines rarely draws upon the advances made in anthropology. He implies that changes in the dynamics of fieldwork and the recognition of reciprocity and consultation are aspects that other disciplines could learn from. As
Couser's work on ethics in life writing draws on the ethical guidelines active in anthropological study, it is not unreasonable to suggest that literary theory might also benefit from attention to consultation and the return of research to community.
The Vulnerable Critic
Critical responsibility to the collaborative text and the lives through which the text is composed begins with recognising that collaboration is suffused with vulnerability. The subject of collaborative life writing is often extremely vulnerable, as Couser argues, but so too may the writing or editing partner experience vulnerability, while the collaborative text they produce is clearly vulnerable, offering a soft target to critics intent on demonstrating the traces of disjunction within collaborative writing. 9 I would suggest that vulnerability also extends, or should extend, to the readers and critics of collaborative Indigenous writing.
As an exchange that exists not solely between a teller and a listener, or co-writers, or a writer and an editor, but continues through the channels of dissemination and is activated in each reading event, collaboration extends its condition of vulnerability to all who enter its sphere. Commenting upon the risks posed to writer, reader and text in postmodern reading exchanges, Mark Ledbetter argues:
The writer's risk is that no longer is s/he the caretaker of the story, but, rather, the narrative is 'set loose' upon the world with limitless possibilities. The reader's risk is the loss of her/his personal story, in the light of a newly existing story that imposes itself on a pre-existing narrative. And the text runs the risk of not being read/heard at all, but rather forced into already existing stories of convenience and authority (144).
In the context of collaboration, membership in this exchange increases while the risks to each member remain undiminished. The multiple producers of the collaborative text all face the certainty of relinquishing control over the narrative they have assisted in shaping.
"The meanings of an ethnographic account are uncontrollable," writes James Clifford.
"Neither the author's intention, nor disciplinary training, nor the rules of genre can limit the readings of a text that will emerge with new historical, scientific, or political projects" In the specific context of collaborative Indigenous life writing, an acceptance of critical vulnerability, I suggest, involves two interrelated procedures. The first of these is openness to dialogue. This is the starting point for an ethics of critical practice, a willingness to engage with those concerned with the same texts and issues and thus a willingness to surrender the distanced stance and authority common to textual study. In the reading of collaborative Indigenous life writing in Canada, openness to dialogue and the critical expression of vulnerability are issues raised by Susanna Egan's reading of 
